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Abstract
Using  longitudinal matched employer-employee data, we  show that a standard
wage equation ignoring firm and individual effects yields a baseline explaining
36 percent of wage variation.  Firm specific wage components, including
common firm-wide omitted human capital, accounts for an additional 22
percent.  Firm pay differentials are large and  persistent. Most of these firm
differentials reflect omitted general human capital.  We also show the
importance of  asymmetric information and unobserved heterogeneity in wage
setting mechanisms.
Résumé:
Nous utilisons une banque de données regroupant de l’information à la fois sur
les employeurs et les employés.  Nous montrons qu’une équation de capital
humain standard qui ignore les effets individuels et les effets de firme explique
environ 36% de la variance observée des salaires.  Les effets de firme
permettent d’expliquer 22% additionnels de cette variance.  Les différences de
salaires entre firmes sont importants et  persistants.  Nous montrons que la plus
grande partie de ces différences de salaires sont causées par l’omission de
certaines variables de capital humain.  Par contre, nous montrons que
l’asymétrie d’information et l’hétérogénéité non observée jouent également un
rôle important dans la détermination des salaires.3
Introduction
In classical economic theory, wages, properly considered, are equal
within competitive homogeneous markets.  In empirical observations, wages are
rarely equal across observationally similar employers and  employees.  An
exceedingly long list of potential explanations has been offered to help account
for this disparity.  In this paper, we use matched employer-employee
longitudinal data to provide evidence on why wages differ across firms and
employees.    This question is central to labor economics, and its answer will
help to identify the power and limits of different types of labor market and
institutional theories.
The debate between competitive and non-competitive theories is
largely one over unobserved factors.  Consider the meaning of differences in
pay across employees.  In market models, these necessarily represent omitted
human capital (clustered within firm or industry); omitted job characteristics
(compensating differentials) or mismeasured compensation.  In other words, to
maintain the market model's predictions, it must be the case that pay differences
across firms are explained variously by the assertions that employees are not
homogeneous (omitted human capital), that employers are not homogeneous
(compensating differentials), or that pay is simply mismeasured.  The alternative
is that labor markets are not perfectly competitive.  Failures of the assumptions
required for competitive markets may involve: 1) imperfect information
concerning employers and employees, or 2) imperfect mobility of employers
and  employees (including barriers to entry.)
Equilibrium Models
The classical economic model of the labor market assumes perfect
information and costless mobility with neither employers nor employees
enjoying  market power.  With homogeneous workers and firms, it predicts
wage equality across both workers and firms.  This model provides the
background for other economic models that relax its assumptions.
Wage differences can be made to fit within this simple model by
positing heterogeneous firms (requiring compensating differentials),4
heterogeneous workers (requiring compensation for unmeasured human capital),
or measurement-error (implying that compensation, properly measured, is
equal).  The compensating differential and measurement error models both
make a testable ancillary prediction:  turnover rates should not differ as a
function of  measured  wages.  The data reject these models, showing instead
that turnover is a decreasing function of wage differentials (Leonard and Van
Audenrode, 1994a).  The simplest measurement error  model also predicts a
particular decay pattern over time, which the data also firmly rejects (Leonard
and Van Audenrode, 1994a).
The omitted human capital model comes in two main varieties that
differ in their prediction on persistence across employers.  Omitted general
human capital, by definition, persists perfectly as the employee moves across
firms.  Specific human capital, or match-specific capital, does not persist across
employers.  The classic models of investments in firm specific human capital do
not predict differences in the present value of earnings across other-wise
comparable workers.  Rather, with shared investments and returns, they predict
steeper tenure - earnings profile.  Among a sub-sample of larger manufacturing
firms, Leonard and Van Audenrode (1994a) observe that steeper profiles are
associated with lower initial pay, a combination that tends to equalize career
earnings and so reduce the firm effects apparent at early or late career stages.
Imperfect Information
The match-specific models are as well suited to accommodating
heterogeneity on both sides of the market as they are unsuited to forming
broadly applicable and testable predictions for the labor market. To say that the
match specific component dominates wages is to say that the labor markets are
highly fragmented.  These models tend to be quite flexible, and without further
assumptions, can accommodate a wide variety of behavior.  With the
assumption that the firm's technology and labor pool do not change over time,
firms' positions in the wage distribution do not change over time. Whether or
not a wage premium paid generally or individually to workers at one firm
persists as these workers move to another employer depends on whether the5
match components are common across firms.  If there are many firms that offer
the same match for each worker then we could expect to see persistence.  But
this very condition implies that the variance of wages is influenced little by
match specific idiosyncrasy, and so undercuts the importance of matching
models at the level of the individual firm.  Match components that are
idiosyncratic to a firm do not, by definition,  persist as the workers moves across
firms.  Match components that are idiosyncratic to the worker are unlikely to
yield strong common firm effects.
Matching models predict that the persistence of wage components will
increase with tenure on the previous job.  Mismatches are more likely to be
found among low than among high tenure employees.  Over time, firms and
workers discover they have made a bad match.  Once this known match value
falls below the expected match value elsewhere less the cost of moving, a
separation ensues.  The highest tenure workers have survived such winnowing
longer, and so are more likely to be better matched.
Let Mij be the match specific component of wages for employee i in
firm j.  Wages are then given by:




Where K is the cost of moving and  E(Mi
*) is the expected match
component at other firms.  Because workers and firms know less about each
other early in a relationship, Mij is lower early in the relationship and the
mobility condition is more easily satisfied.  But this implies low persistence.
Low tenure workers are more likely than are high tenure to move because of
mismatch. Moving because of mismatching implies low persistence.
Individuals who learn of better matches will have little persistence in individual
wage components.  Workers coming from firms that invest little in selection or6
that do a poor job of matching will also show little persistence of firm wage
effects.
Less complex models of imperfect information also attempt to explain
pay differences across homogeneous firms and workers (see Stigler).  Firms that
accidentally pay too generously in a competitive market correct their mistake or
exit.  Firms that accidentally pay too little cannot attract or keep employees.
Even with imperfect information, the competitive model predicts regression to
the mean in the distribution of firm wages.
The outcome of this search depends not only on the distribution of
other wages, but also on reservation wages.  Among workers facing the same
distribution of  offer wages, those with lower reservation wages will have less
persistent wage components.  They will be reemployed over a larger portion of
the offer wage distribution.  The resulting higher variance in reemployment
wages reduces the correlation of past and future wages.
1
At the other end of the spectrum are non-market clearing models in
which firm and individual wage differences are not transient but chronic.  Rent
sharing models predict that firms will maintain their position in the wage
distribution.  However, there is no reasons for any subsequent employer to pay a
similar premium to exiles from a rent-sharing firm, so rent sharing models
predict no persistence of the pure firm component of a previous employer's
wage premium at a new employer.
In short and rough form, that covers much of what theoretical labor
economics has to say about the distribution of wages across employers.  Theory
of course, has had a great deal more to say, but with the striking exception of
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis's pathbreaking work, theory in this area has been
able to proceed largely unencumbered by evidence derived from following
employees across identified employers. These foundation models of wage
determination make distinctive predictions about the persistence of wage
                        
1 Actually, the relationship between reservation wage, unemployment duration
and wage persistence is slightly more complicated.  The key to wage persistence
is not the reservation wage by itself, but whether this reservation wage is
reasonable or not (i.e. the worker is not trying to hold on to non-transferable
rents).  (Leonard and Van Audenrode, 1995)7
components across employees and employers.  If firm effects represent omitted
general human capital, movers should retain their  premium.  Wage differentials
should survive intact the transition to a new employer.  Such unmeasured human
capital would account both for clustered mobility and for persistent wage
premiums.
Firm differentials that represent the firm’s sharing of economic rent
should not survive a transition.  More precisely, such rents follow the firm
irrespective of the workers, rather than following the worker, irrespective of the
firm.  If indeed we observed workers moving from one high rent firm to another
- (mobility concentrated within rent classes) we could see persistence, but we
would then have to question the pure rent interpretation, because there is no
reason why any subsequent firm should prefer workers lucky enough to enjoy
rents on a previous job.
The first type of tests follow workers and asks whether they
maintain their previous firm’s wage component as they change employers.  We
also employ a conceptually distinct test of the persistence of firm wage
components.   This second type of test follows firms and asks whether each
firm’s wage differential remains unchanged over time as it slowly changes its
workforce, and as market conditions change.  Firm wage differentials that
represent measurement error will quickly decay.  Firm wage differentials that
represent omitted human capital not actively selected for will decay with the rate
of workforce turnover (generally about 9 percent per year (Leonard and Van
Audenrode, 1994a)).  In search models, the rate of decay depends on both the
cost of search, and on the benefits as given by the distribution of firm wages.
Belgium has suffered double-digit unemployment for much of the past two
decades.  It offers unemployment benefits without time limit, that formally
require active search.  More important than what the regulations say is what
people do.  Empirically, the job finding rate is similar in the first and in the fifth
and subsequent quarters of unemployment (Leonard and Van Audenrode, 1995).
Even when the distribution of firm differentials remains unchanged, search
models predict the decay of individual firm effects.8
The core of this paper is then the use of measures of persistence in
wage components across employers to differentiate competitive from non-
competitive models of the labor market. Underlying productivity differences
predict persistence.  Market imperfections such as imperfect information or
imperfect mobility predict transience.
Data
We use a longitudinal matched employer-employee data set for the
population of private sector employees in Belgium in 1983, 1984 and 1985.
This allows us to follow employees across employers.  If mobility were a
random event, firm and individual wage components could be identified using
movers.  In practice, movers may not be random reallocations of workers across
firms.  Moves that are endogenous may yield biased estimates of wage
components.  To see this consider the model:
Wij = B Xi + Fj + I +eij  .
The I and Fj components are unobserved individual and firm fixed wage
components, but can be identified (up to a normalization) using movers:
 (Wik-Wij  )  =   (Fk-Fj) +  (eik-eij).
The individual component is differenced out, leaving the difference in
firm effects and the change in errors.  The latter term is mean zero and
uncorrelated with (Fk-Fj) if moves are random reallocations.  This restriction is
unlikely to hold in practice.  Workers who receive a negative error in their
current job and a positive error on an offered job are more likely to move. In
this case,  DW will theoretically overestimate (Fk-Fj) among movers from one
firm to another.
The point is that unbiased estimates of firm effects are more likely to
be obtained from job changes that are exogenous rather than endogenous to the
wage distribution.  Easier said than done.  To reduce this type of potential bias,9
we select a subset of workers who are more likely to have lost their job for
reasons independent of their current and offered wages.
Of the 2,680,344 employees of Belgian private firms in 1983, 88,869
left firms that reduced employment by at least 25 positions between 1983 and
1984, including firms that ceased to report any employees by 1984.  We
concentrate our analysis on these job losses due to mass or total layoff.  We take
a 1 in 5 random sample of these, and identify the firms they first find
reemployment in by 1986.  We then augment our sample of movers (not of
firms) by including all other displaced workers who were reemployed in these
same firms.  So movers here are displaced from dead or dying firms.  The origin
firms are a random sample of those in the private sector displacing workers (by
our definition).  The destination firms are a random sample of those first
reemploying workers displaced in 1983 within the subsequent three years.
Within these firms we include the population of movers between any of the
firms  in the origin set and any of the firms in the destination set, so as to
increase the  within firm precision of our estimates.  This yields the population
of workers moving among a random sample of declining private firms and the
private firms that reemploy the random sample of displaced workers within
three years.
The data used here are firm-based and not establishment based.  A
common problem with such data is the possibility of labeling as a transition
what is only a legal change- a company disappearing to reappear under a new
name, mergers, etc..  Although Belgian Social Security and Employment
contract laws are quite restrictive with regard to these legal changes
2, we
excluded from our sample any suspicious transition.
3
                        
2 A change in employer identifier number implies a change in legal
liability for the payment of past and present social security taxes. This cannot
happen solely as a result of a merger, acquisition or change in ownership.  Even
bankruptcy and the death of the employer are not sufficient conditions to
generate a change in employer identifier.  
3  We excluded from the sample any transitions where more than 50% of
the exiles from a dying firm ended up at the same new employer after a spell of
unemployment of less than 100 days.  This restriction reduces estimated
persistence but does not fundamentally alter our conclusions.10
Methodology
We first estimate a pre-displacement wage equation of the type:
Wio = B Xi + Fo + (I*o +eij)
where the subscript i  refers to the I’th worker, the subscript o refers to the old
job, the subscript n refers to the new job,  F is the firm effect, and I the
individual effect.  We estimate this cross-section equation amongst the 419,441
workers who were employed in the 931 firms which laid off one of the workers
included in our sample.  In Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis’ terminology, our
firm effect Fo is the sum of a pure idiosyncratic difference in average firm
wages (not justified by any observed or unobserved individual differences) and
of the firm average of individual effects; while our individual effect is the sum
of within firm pure individual unobserved heterogeneity and of a random error
term: Io = (I*o +eij). Fo and Io represent respectively these firm and individual
effects in the old job.
We then estimate the same cross-section specification among all the
workers employed at any firm which rehired one of the workers in our sample
during the year this worker was hired. Fn and In represent respectively the firm
and individual effects in the new job.
Persistence is tested by looking at movements by workers in the
distribution of individual and firm effects across jobs, and by formally testing
how Fo and Io affect Win.  Finally, another original contribution of this
paper will be to look at the symmetry in persistence. In addition to formally
testing how Fo and Io affect Win, we will examine how Fn and In affect Wio.
Clustering and Transitions Across Employers
Mobility or its threat drive markets toward equilibrium.  Within a
competitive labor market, wages can move toward equilibrium by regression to11
the mean in the distribution of firm wages, and by the individual mobility from
low wage and higher wage firms.
Here we present the first analysis of mobility across employers.  In
terms of position in the distribution of firm and individual wages, existing
economic theories model mobility as a function of the present value of earnings
(utility), irrespective of its components.
We classify movers into quartiles of the previous and new job firm
effects.  Conditional on firm effects, age, sex, and broad occupation, we also
classify movers into quartiles of the within firm wage residual distribution.
If these firm and individual wage differences were nothing but
measurement error, transitions across states classified solely on this basis should
be random.  Origin state and destination state would be independent.  Noise
does not persist across employers.
If the wage components represent compensating differentials, mobility
should not be a function of wage, and wage components need not be similar
across employees.  In hedonic wage models, compensation differentials depend
on the distribution across firms of the marginal cost of reducing unpleasant
working conditions as well as on the distribution across employees of the
marginal disutilities of such unpleasant conditions.  The same process that
matches a high marginal disutility worker with a low cost of mitigation firm
could lead to transitions across firms with similar firm wage components.
However, this mechanism is doubtful because in other work (Leonard and Van
Audenrode,1996) we see that turnover is a function of firm wage premia, which
would not occur if these premia were just compensating differentials.
If the wage components represented pure economic rent, we would not
expect them to affect mobility across the distribution.  An exile from one high
wage firm would not be preferentially selected into another high wage firm if
the firm wage component is indeed a pure rent.  Of course, if high wage firms
select higher quality workers, the premium is no longer a pure rent.
Even if the wage components represent omitted human capital, current
models predict only random moves in the firm of individual wage distributions
as long as the total wage change exceeds the cost of moving.  In addition, the12
omitted human capital theory predicts that mobility within the distribution of
firm effects will be negatively corrected with mobility within the distribution of
individual wage effects.
The second channel of wage equilibration, outlier firms in the wage
distribution moving toward the mean, is active in muted form.  In a sample of
312 large Belgian manufacturing firms, we find that firm effects are correlated
.97 one year apart, and .83 seven years apart.  This slow 3 percent annual decay
rate is inconsistent with simple measurement error stories, and does not suggest
intensive search whittling away differentials based on poor information.   Nor is
it entirely compatible with centralized collective-bargaining setting uniform
industry wide wages.    In other contexts going back at least as far as Dunlop,
such persistent firm wage differentials have been taken as evidence of
imperfectly competitive labor or product markets.   They may also indicate
persistent differences in unmeasured human capital.
Because firm effect do decay over time, a fixed-effect model fitted to
such data will yield smaller fixed effects when estimated over longer spans of
time.  Clearly, the usefulness of the fixed effect approximation declines in
longer time-spans.
A Model of Clustering
Clustering occurs when the distribution of human capital within firms
is truncated.  In production function terms, the elasticity of substitution in
productions across different levels or types of human capital is low.  If human
capital is partly unobserved, then two predictions follow.  First, firm wage
components will account for much wage variation, and individual components
for relatively little.  The firm component will reflect the common omitted
human capital among (like) individuals within firms.  Second, clustering
distinctively predicts few moves across the firm wage distribution.  Skills that
are particularly valuable in one part of the firm wage distribution reduce the
incidence of moves of high wage workers at lower-wage firms to relatively
(compared to the new firm mean) poorly paid positions at high-wage firms,
even though such moves could otherwise satisfy the mobility conditions.13
For displaced workers, as shown in Table 1, most transitions are
between different employers in the same quartile of the firm wage distribution.
In addition, most mobility leaves the individual in the same quartile of the
within-firm wage distribution -- even though the individual changes firms.
This result rejects theories of wage differentials as measurement error,
or as pure economic rents shared by the firm.  It is consistent with the clustering
model:  omitted human capital with limited elasticities of substitution across
human capital classes within firms.  This clustering will yield evidence of
persistent firm effects even as employees move across firms.
Wage Results
The first generation of empirical labor economics has enjoyed great
success in explaining one-third of the cross-sectional variance in wages, largely
by reference to the highly significant human capital proxies of age, education
and experience.  That leaves only two-thirds of wages to be explained.  Of
course, we can soak up all wage variance without greatly increasing
understanding by the liberal use of individual dummies.  Our aim is different:  to
establish the nature of heterogeneity, partition it into firm and individual
components, and by the systematic analysis of these components discover
general patterns that we use to test the basic models of the labor market.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for four sub-groups:  employees
who stayed at the old firm, displaced movers, hires at the new firm who did not
come from the displacing firms, and incumbents at the new firms.  In this table,
old firm refers to employers who displaced workers [ but not dead firms who
cannot have stayers].  New firm refers to the firms that first reemployed the
displaced workers.  Displaced workers who find reemployment within 3 years
are younger, have less tenure, are more likely to be women and blue-collar, and
are paid 16 percent less than are the workers who remain in declining firms.
If movers were randomly selected and randomly reallocated across
firms, they would be indistinguishable from stayers, importing and exporting
firms would be indistinguishable, and on average wages would not change with
movement.  Unsurprisingly, none of these hold true.  Movers in fact enjoy14
nominal wage increases of 7.6 percent.  Under the simplest models' restrictions,
(exogenous mobility, human capital held fixed, zero mean independent error in
the wage change equation), this would be translated as importing firms paying
more than exporting firms.  The average mover goes from a firm in which he is
paid 1.3 percent below the firm mean, adjusted for age, sex, broad occupation
and tenure; to one in which he is paid 4.3 above the firm mean.  The importing
firms, (those which reemploy displaced workers) employ a younger workforce,
with less tenure, in more white-collar positions.  So the 7.6 percent wage gain of
movers can be decomposed into a 2.0 percent gain due to moving to higher
wage firms, and a 5.6 percent gain by moving up within the firm distribution of
wages.   About these means, the correlation of change in firm wage component
with change in individual wage component is negative.   This result is
consistent with sorting models of movements across firms.  Poor performers in
the big leagues   tend to move down the firm distribution.  Minor league
successes show some upward movement.
Using only information on the movers' sex, age, and broad occupation
(blue-collar or white-collar) we can account for 36 percent of wage variation in
the previous job (see Table 3, eq. 13).  Contemporaneous firm components
account for an additional 22 percent of wage variation (of which about half is an
industry effect), with individual components accounting for the remaining 42
percent.  By themselves, firm effects account for slightly more wage variation
(37 percent) than do the standard individual characteristics.
Longitudinal matched employee-employer data allows us to analyze
the persistent effects of these firm and individual wage components.  Table 3
presents baseline equations for the reemployment or new job wage (equations 5
to 8).  We want to know whether the firm-wide and individual factors that led to
wage differences on the old job cause the same differences in the new job.
Equations 1 to 4 of  Table 3 answer this question by estimating the effect on
new job wages of Fo and Io - the firm and individual wage components in the
old job.
We see persistent effects.  Those who were employed in firms paying
high wages, or who were paid above average within the old firm, tend to be paid15
more in the new firm.  This persistence would not be predicted by rent-sharing,
by measurement error or by firm specific human capital models.  In addition, we
would expect rents or compensating differentials to affect workers broadly
within each firm, and so load onto the firm rather than the individual wage
component.  Persistent effects of past wage components are consistent with
omitted general human capital.  While this may seem plausible for individual
effects, it may not be readily apparent why a successor firm should pay
employees more because they are exiting from a high wage firm.  In terms of
the human capital model, the firm component as measured here includes, in
addition to the firm effect that is independent of the workers, the component of
omitted human capital common to workers within the firm.  In terms of Abowd,
Kramarz and Margolis's specifications, Fo is the sum of a pure idiosyncratic
difference in average firm wages not justified by any observed or unobserved
individual differences and of the firm average of individual effects.  Because the
first component has no value to other employers, the persistence we observe
indicates that the firm-wide common component of general human capital is
larger.  Note also that the proportion of the last job's wage premium left behind
is greater for the individual than for the firm components.  Workers are more
likely to carry forward wage premiums due to having been at a high-pay firm
than those due to having been well paid within the firm, (although the former
effect is muted in the sub-sample that controls for industry).  This may reflect
the better information employers have of each other than of each other's
employees, because each transfer increases the precision of firm estimates while
leaving that of individual estimates unchanged.  Or, it may be that individual
wage variation within firms is less due to general human capital than is the firm-
wide common component.
That said, it is also true that new and old employers partition human
capital differently.  An example helps to explain this.  Consider two classes of
firms and two classes of workers.  If class I firms always and only employ Class
I workers (perfect matching or segregation), then the new firm's wage carries no
information beyond that already contained in the old firm's wage.  Firms do not
segregate to that extent, or value different parts of human capital differently.16
Controlling for Fn, the new job's firm effect, Fo (the old jobs firm effect) is still
significant, although greatly reduced in magnitude.
The Use of Movers to Identify Firm Effects
Movers could help to partition our firm effect into pure firm
differences and systematic individual differences within firms.  As we have
shown, for movers
(Wik-Wij) =  (Fk-Fj) +  (eik-eij).  The assumptions needed to identify relative
firm effects are that the reallocation of workers across firms is random, i.e. 1)
E(eik-eij)=0, and 2) the change in errors is independent of the change in firm
effects.
In fact the necessary identifying assumptions are violated in practice.
Movers are not a random draw of employees, nor does the reallocation of
workers across jobs resemble a random process.  Nor would standard migration
models predict them to be.  We have purposely selected a sample of movers
from declining or dying firms precisely to increase the chances of observing
mobility exogenous to individual wage offers.  The death or decline of the firm
takes the role of the proverbial helicopter drop of employees onto the labor
market.  Despite this sample selection, we observe wage changes consistent with
voluntary mobility models and inconsistent with the identifying assumptions.
In standard mobility models, workers who receive a positive external
wage offer or a negative internal wage offer are more likely to move.  In Table
4, we show wage changes for bilateral flows.  These are three pairs of  firms in
which at least 10 workers moved each way between 1983 and 1984.  Unlike the
rest of this paper, the initial sample is drawn from a sample of large
manufacturing firms, rather than from the population of declining firms, and so
is more likely to include voluntary movers.
In each case, the movers experience substantial wage gains in both
directions of the bilateral flows.  In all cases, the average wage gains exceed the
4.3 percent wage growth enjoyed by the average Belgian between 1983 and
1984.  The simplest and strongest evidence that the identifying assumption is
violated is that in practice movers from firm A to Firm B, and from Firm B to17
Firm A, both gain, and gain relative to stayers.  Simply put, it cannot be that
Firm A pays more than Firm B, and that Firm B pays more than Firm A.  The
obvious interpretation is that (eik-eij) dominates (Fk-Fj).  While compatible
with mobility models, this undercuts the use of movers to identify firm effects.
Note also that the existence of these simultaneous bilateral flows
suggests the importance of matching in labor market across firms.  Pure scale
effects (undifferentiated product demand shocks affecting firms with
homogeneous workers) cannot account for the simultaneous exchange of
workers between firms.  It is not unusual for firms to exchange employees.
Finally, as previous work has established (Freeman), wage changes are
notoriously noisy.
Matching in the Labor Market
The matching model of the labor market predicts that mismatched
employees will leave their pasts behind, and that such mismatches are most
likely to be found early in an employment spell.  At longer tenure levels,
workers are less likely to separate because of the (late) discovery of mismatches.
As the matching model predicts, tenure on the previous job strongly
affects the persistence of the individual wage component.  (See Table 5).
Among workers separating during their first year with an employer, only 39
percent of the individual wage component carries over into the new job’s wage.
This rises to 70 percent among those who left their previous employer after 6 or
more years on the job.
Wages from short employment spells carry less information about
persistent productivity.  At longer tenure, more productivity information has
been revealed, and workers are more likely to be displaced exogenously than
displaced because of mismatch.  The greater persistence of individual effects
among longer tenure workers is also consistent with higher reservation wages,
conditional on human capital, and on the high-tenure displaced being better
informed of the labor market.  The sharp difference in persistence between low
and high tenure workers in Table 5 indicates that, as in matching models, the18
individual component of wages from short duration matches carries relatively
little information of use to subsequent employers.
Fixed Effects?
Even more crucial to the identification of pure firm and individual
effects is the assumption that these effects are fixed.
Fixed effects do not respect history.  The past and the future are treated
identically and symmetrically in these ahistorical models.  If firm and individual
effects are imperfectly observed by employers, individual effects cannot be
fixed and cannot be treated symmetrically in the old and the new jobs, even
though a specification that starts with the restriction of fixed effects is likely to
find some average persistence to label as a fixed effect.  Here we test whether
the individual wage component is a fixed effect by examining whether it is
symmetrical when time is reversed.  The same argument holds for the part of the
firm effect that reflects common omitted worker quality.
In equation 9 to 16 of Table 3 we see the effects of the future on the
past are not symmetric with those of the past on the future.  The future firm
component has less of an “impact” on the past wage, than the past firm
component has on the future.  The relative size of the individual effects is
reversed.  The degree to which the firm and individual wage components would
load onto firm and individual fixed effects would differ between past and future
wages components.  In other words, the firm and individual components
identified here are not just fixed effects.
Firm Effects
The past firm component has a coefficient in the future wage equation
that is about .77, implying that it carries 77 percent of its impact on
contemporaneous wages.  This is a striking result.  It suggests that only about 23
percent of the variation in firm wages is due to rents, with the remainder
presumably reflecting unmeasured human capital.  The exact ratio here is
sensitive to specification, and would be expected to fall with the inclusion of
additional direct controls for human capital.  Nevertheless, this suggests the19
Belgian labor market is subject to competitive forces, and that firm wage
differentials need not be entirely incompatible with this competition.
Alternatively, the ratio of cross to contemporaneous effects may be
taken to reflect Bayesian information processing by subsequent employers.  In
terms of a simple measurement error model, subsequent employers are acting as
though the noise to signal ratio in the variance of past firm wages was about
0.23.
We would expect this error variance to be a larger component of the
individual effect, because the individual effect absorbs the residual.  The
individual effect here includes anything and everything that affects wages other
than common firm components and sample-wide returns to age, sex, broad
occupation and tenure.  Even with this all-encompassing definition, 42 percent
of the past job's individual effect carries over to the new job.  In terms of the
measurement error model, this implies that the variance of errors is 38% greater
than that of true individual effects.  Information on position within the past
firm‘s wage distribution is discounted, but it is used by subsequent employers.
The fact that firm effects carry over into new jobs in such a large
proportion indicates that they act as a quality signal.  Prospective employers
imperfectly informed of a potential employees productivity may take average
pay levels at the previous employer as a signal of productivity rather than as a
sign of rents.
The distinctive feature of signals is that they operate unidirectionally in
time:  signals can be sent only from the past to the future.  The data do not
accept this restriction.  Future firm wages “cause” previous wages.  This is
consistent with the future and previous firm wage components representing
dimensions of general human capital omitted by the econometrician -- but
observed by employers.
Bayesian Information Processing
In any country, the distribution of firms ranges from a few large and
well known to a multitude of small and largely unknown.  A prospective
employer’s task in interpreting past wages is to isolate that portion due to20
persistent productivity differences from factors extraneous to the next job such
as the past job’s rents, compensating differentials, mismatches or accidents.  The
employer learns much of the distinguishing information  from experience.  In
previous work (Leonard and Van Audenrode 1994) we used the age and size of
the previous employer as proxies for the precision of information others were
likely to have of it.  Here we improve on those proxies by measuring experience
directly.
We measure the gross flow of employees from one firm to another.
The larger this flow, the better able will be the subsequent employer to
distinguish productivity from extraneous wage components.  In Bayesian theory,
each employer starts with an uninformed, flat prior concerning  all others.  As
firm A samples (hires) more of firm B’s exiles, the precision of firm A’s
estimate of the rent and productivity components of firm B’s pay increases.
Table 6 offers strong support of this type of Bayesian updating.  In this
table, movers are stratified by the gross flow from origin to destination firms.
As the Bayesian updating model predicts, both prior firm and individual wage
components are sharply discounted if the importing firm has hired few people
from the exporting firm.  The persistence of past individual components
increases from .21 with less than 5 hires, to more than .84 with 50 or more hires.
The persistence of past firm components increases from .37 to .95 with more
than 100 hires.  Clearly, a methodology that looks for a common individual
component across employers will be able to load more of the variance onto such
individual fixed effects in cases with greater gross flows.  At the other end, the
fixed-effect methodology will report greater idiosyncratic variation (pure firm
and error components) among smaller, younger and lower turnover firms.  The
degree to which "fixed" individual effects will be found is, as Table 6
demonstrates, a function of the gross flow from one firm to another.
The second column of this table is a specification test.  The information
processing story is unidirectional.  If, however, the gross flow rate acts in part as
a proxy for some other omitted variable (size, turnover rate, etc.) then new firm
individual and firm wage components would show similarly distinct correlations
with past wage when movers were stratified by the gross flow from old to new21
firm.  In both cases the stratification yields a much muted form of the
persistence differentials observed running time forward.
The information content of past wages will differ for exiles from dead
firms compared to those from ongoing firms.  The former are more likely to
have been released onto the market for reasons exogenous to their individual
productivity.  In other work, we confirm this distinction (Leonard and Van
Audenrode, 1994a).
Further Specification Tests
Our persistence tests partition residual wage variance.  This section
examines the potential sensitivity of our results to heterogeneity in omitted
human capital.  To test the impact of this unobservable, we use the following
maintained assumptions:  1) education is general human capital, and 2) the
education of white-collar workers is more dispersed and has a greater impact on
their wages than that of blue-collar workers.
Omitted general human capital, by definition, has wage effects that
persist across employees.  Under the maintained assumptions, if omitted
education drove our persistence results, we would expect to see greater
persistence among white than blue-collar workers.  Table 7 shows that this
pattern does not hold.  Under the maintained assumptions, this suggests omitted
education does not drive the persistence results.  That leaves the question of why
persistence of both firm and individual wage components is greater for blue-
collar. This persistence may reflect omitted human capital independent of
education.
Skill requirements are typically thought to be more common within
than across industry.  Other studies have shown that displaced workers who are
reemployed outside their original industry suffer more severe wage losses. Table
8 confirms a human capital explanation of firm wage effects that is consistent
with previous accounts. The persistence of firm effect is about half as large
when workers change industry as when they change firms within an industry.22
AKM vs. LVA Technology
Here we present direct comparisons of the AKM fixed-effect estimates
with our more flexible specification.  Both sets of estimates are based on the
population of workers who ever touched any of 312 large Belgian
manufacturing firms between 1978 and 1985.  Table 9 presents the AKM
specification imposing both fixed individual and fixed firm effects.  The
important result here is the strong evidence of clustering.  There are highly
significant firm effects (eq. 2), and highly significant individual effects (eq. 3),
but these are almost entirely joint effects.  Equation 4 shows that the marginal
contribution of either firm or individual effects is small once the other is
controlled for, as we would expect with human capital clustering.  These large
joint effects are not an artifact of small firm size: the average firm in this sample
has more than 800 employees.
The second important result is that cross-section and pooled cross-
section estimates of the returns to experience (age) severely underestimate the
life-cycle or within cohort effects.  Controlling for individual, the returns to
experience are nearly triple those found in the pooled cross-sections without
individual controls.  This occurs because entry wages have been bid up over
time (over successive cohorts), and successive cohorts are not perfect substitutes
(or equivalently, wage levels at entry have long-term effects over the working
life).  Note also that workers who move between blue-collar and white-collar
jobs are unusual, and do not share in the average occupation effects.  As we
have observed before, a substantial part of the female wage penalty occurs
through segregation into low wage firms.
Our specification that does not impose the fixed-effects restriction is
shown in Table 10. Among the employees of these 312 firms are 13,859 who
moved between any two of these 312 firms in successive years between 1978
and 1985.   We estimate a version  of our standard regressions of new wage on
old wage components (eq.2) and of old wage on new wage components (eq.1).
for movers pooled across years.
We see that our previous attempts to isolate moves exogenous to the
wage distributions was  at least partly successful.  The 312 firm sample is not23
limited to declining or dying firms, and so includes many more mis-matched
workers who quit or are individually fired.  Wage differences due to mismatch,
by definition, do not persist.  The importance of such mismatch can be seen in
the dramatically lower persistence of both individual and firm wage components
in this sample.
In addition, even though the individual and firm effects that persist
over time are highly correlated with each other, we can clearly estimate separate
(similar) coefficients.
Table 10 also confirms a number of results that are well-known from
the displaced worker literature.  Differencing the returns on the new job and the
old job while controlling for heterogeneity, we see that older workers lose from
a move, that white-collar movers gain more than blue-collar movers, and that
male movers gain more than female movers.  Movers are substantially different
than stayers.  In particular the movers in Table 10 sacrifice most of the returns
to experience enjoyed by the average worker in these same firms (Table 9).
Conclusion
Using  longitudinal matched employer-employee data, we have shown
the following:
1. A standard wage equation ignoring firm and individual effects yields a
baseline explaining 36 percent of wage variation.
2. Firm specific wage components, including common firm-wide omitted
human capital, accounts for an additional 22 percent.  Firm pay
differentials are large, persistent, and can account (incrementally!) for
about two-thirds as much of the variation in wages as do the standard
(human capital) measures of age, tenure, sex and broad occupation.  By
themselves, firm effects account for slightly more wage variation than
do the standard individual characteristics.
3. Most of these firm differentials reflect omitted general human capital.
About 77 percent of a firm premium paid at a prior firm is carried
forward to a subsequent employer.  This suggests a limited role for
compensating differentials, rent sharing, pay errors, measurement24
errors,  or firm specific institutional factors in explaining wage
differences across firms.
4. Imperfect information is an important constraint in the labor market.
We directly measure labor market contacts between employers and find
that familiarity breeds wage persistence.  Hiring firms act as Bayesians,
updating their priors with each hire from another firm.  In consequence,
an alternative methodology that looks for fixed individual effects will
find them more important when the gross flow between firms is
greater.
5. Mismatch models are useful in explaining the lack of persistent firm
and individual wage components among low tenure movers.
6. The attempt to identify firm effects using movers depends on an
identifying assumption at odds with standard mobility models, and at
odds with observed patterns.  The wage changes of movers are
dominated not by the difference in firm effects between origin and
destination firms, but by the difference in error components.  This
occurs  because people receiving a positive surprise in this error
difference are more likely to move.  Methods that ignore this may fall
prey to identifying as relative firm effects a difference in noise,
weighted by interfirm net flows.
7. Human capital clusters within firms as would be expected if there were
little elasticity of substitution between skill classes in production.  The
component of omitted human capital common within the firm is large.
Most mobility occurs among firms in the same part of the distribution
of firm wages.
8. About 40 percent of the individual wage residual appears to represent
human capital that earns a return at subsequent employers.
There is no doubt that the next generation of innovations in empirical
labor economics will exploit this type of rich matched European employer -
employee data.  Nor that the chief challenge of this work will be finding
systematic patterns in heterogeneous behavior.25
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Table 1: Transition Matrices of Individual Effects and Firm Effects
Individual Effect:




















Low effect is an effect in the lowest quartile, while high effect is an effect in the
upper quartile.
Firm Effect:




















Low effect is an effect in the lowest quartile. High  is an effect in the upper
quartile.
Joint Effects:

























































Low  is an effect below median value. Value in parentheses are the proportion
of rows.27








Age 38.06 35.51 27.15 35.55
Tenure Old Job 5.77 5.13 NA NA
Tenure New Job NA 0 0 4.33
Prop. Men .729 .632 .550 .604
Prop White Collars .462 .423 .544 .631
Prop. From Dying Firm 0 .503 NA NA











Individual Effect O J -.0125
(.292)
Individual Effect N J NA .0432
(.277)28












1. New Wage .770 (.008) .547 (.006) Yes No .649
2. .774 (.008) .546 (.006) No No .644
3. .616 (.014) .569 (.009) Yes Yes .683
4. .629 (.014) .571 (.009) No Yes .677
5. -- -- Yes No .386
6. -- -- No No .377
7. -- -- Yes Yes .490
8. -- -- No Yes .483
9. Old Wage .576 (.008) .655 (.006) Yes No .600
10. .581 (.008) .661 (.006) No No .595
11. .425 (.014) .687 (.010) Yes Yes .665
12. .432 (.014) .698 (.010) No Yes .658
13. -- -- Yes No .357
14. -- -- No No .345
15. -- -- Yes Yes .478
16. -- -- No Yes .461
The rows labeled New Wage report the coefficients of old wage firm and
individual components in a regression of the form:
Ln(Wage New Job)= Xb +b Individual Effect Old Job +b Firm Effect Old Job.
The rows labeled Old Wage report the coefficients from regressions of the form:
Ln(Wage Old Job)= Xb +b Individual Effect New Job +b Firm Effect New Job
X always include age, age squared, a dummy variable for sex and a dummy
variable for occupation.  Others controls are added as reported.  Tenure consists
of a variable for tenure, one for tenure squared and a dummy variable equal to 1
when tenure is censored., on the old job.   Industry consists of a set of nine
dummy variables controlling for 1-digit SEC classification.  25,670 movers are
observed when industry is not controlled for.  Industry is identified for 9,794
movers.29
Table 4:  Labor Power Parity: Wage Gains of Identical Workers in Pairs of
Firms.
Variable:  Log(Average Daily Wage 84) - Log (Average Daily Wage 83) for
workers reporting a 1983 wage in the origin firm and a 1984 wage in the























Note: Log(Average Daily Wage 84) - Log (Average Daily Wage 83) in the full
population = .043
The sample is of workers observed in pairs of firms with bilateral flows of at
least 10 workers in each direction between 1983 and 1984.  All workers,
including multiple job holders,  who report a 1983 wage in the origin firm and a
1984 wage in the destination firm are included.30
Table 5: Persistence of Individual Effects by Tenure on Old Job
Control for Tenure No Control for Tenure
New wage Old wage New wage Old wage
Individual Effect
 when Tenure on
Lost Job is:
1 year .392 .595 .396 .586
2 years .498 .636 .503 .628
3 years .443 .669 .443 .665
4 years .628 .685 .625 .687
5 years .579 .627 .578 .662
6 years and more .697 .683 .693 .699
Firm effect .776 .576 .781 .581
Adj. R. Squared .656 .600 .650 .596
All standard errors are below .026
The columns headed New Wage report the coefficients on old wage individual
components in a regression of the form:
Ln(Wage New Job)= Xb +b Individual Effect Old Job +b Firm Effect Old Job,
for the new wage, and
Ln(Wage Old Job)= Xb +b Individual Effect New Job +b Firm Effect New Job,
for the old wage.  X always include age, age squared, a dummy variable for sex
and a dummy variable for occupation.  Others controls are added as reported.
Tenure consists of a variable for tenure, one for tenure squared and a dummy
variable equal to 1 when tenure is censored., on the old job.  31
Table 6:  Persistence of Effects by Number of Contacts between Old and
New Employers
New Wage Old wage
Individual Effect by
Number of Contacts Between
Old and New Employers
Less than 5 .209 .336
5 to 10 .188 .454
10 to 25 .322 .560
25 to 50 .511 .780
50 to 100 .880 .812
more than 100 .841 .752
Firm Effect by
Number of Contacts Between
Old and New Employers
Less than 5 .372 .405
5 to 10 .635 .502
10 to 25 .836 .541
25 to 50 .821 .650
50 to 100 .836 .682
more than 100 .953 .600
Adjusted  R-Squared .705 .615
All standard errors are below .035.
These equations control for age, age squared, sex, broad occupation, tenure,
tenure squared, and truncated tenure on the old job.
The variable ‘number of contacts’ is defined as the number of workers laid off
by employer i who are rehired by employer j.  This variable is calculated for
each mover.  In the regressions estimated on the sample of 25,670 movers and
reported above,  we report the coefficients on individual and firm wage
components interacted with dichotomous variables categorizing these gross
flows between employers.32
Table 7:  Firm Persistence for Blue and White Collar Workers
Dependent Variable: Log(New Wage)
Coefficient Standard Error
Age .0177 .0012
Age Squared -.00016 .0000
Tenure .0564 .0078
Tenure Squared -.0083 .0014
Permanent .0937 .0123
Male .3039 .0037
White Collar .3398 .0047
Individual Effect Old Job:
Blue Collar .7395 .0066
White Collar .4632 .0102
Firm Effect Old Job:
Blue Collar .7829 .0110
White Collar .7706 .0099
Adjusted R-Squared .655
Permanent refers to a worker with at least 6 years tenure with the previous
employer.33
Table 8:  Firm Persistence for Workers Changing Industry
Dependent Variable: Log(New Wage)
Control For Industry
Age .0148 (.0019)
Age Squared -.00015 (.0000)
Tenure .0491 (.0118)
Tenure Squared -.0081 (.0020)
Perm .1316 (.0187)
Male .2880 (.0064)
White Collar .2990 (.0066)
Individual Effect Old Job .5607 (.0084)
Firm Effect Old Job:
Same Industry .8029 (.0167)
Different Industry .4333 (.0166)
Adjusted R-Squared .695
N 9,794
9 Dummy variables controlling for industry of new job added and not shown.34
Table 9:  Firm and Individual Effects in Belgium
Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis specification on 312 manufacturing firms, 1978
1985.
Age .0338 (.0001) .0269 (.0001) .0786 (.0001) .0785 (.0001)
Age Squared -.0004 (.0000) -.0003 (.0000) -.0021 (.0000) -.0021 (.0001)
Male .3010 (.0004) .2445 (.0004) .0004 (.0003) -.0002 (.0002)
White Collar .2303 (.0004) .2226 (.0003) -.0297 (.0033) -.0294 (.0034)
Firm Effect No Yes No Yes
Individual
Effect
No Nos Yes Yes
Adjusted
R-Squared
.5416 .6439 .6732 .6734
7 Dummy variables included to control for year.35
Table 10:  Firm and Individual Effects in Belgium
Leonard and Van Audenrode specification on 312 manufacturing firms, 1978-
1985.
N=13,859
Old Wage New Wage
Age .0523 (.0016) .0154 (.0014)
Age Squared -.0006 (.0000) -.0001 (.0000)
Male .2637 (.0074) .3025 (.0068)
White Collar .1202 (.0052) .2549 (.0048)
Firm Effect Old Job .3435 (.0152)
Individual Effect Old Job .3654 (.0083)
Firm Effect New Job .3925 (.0176)




6 Dummy variables included to control for year.